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ARGUMENT
I. APPELLEES "STATEMENT OF FACTS" REFERENCES PORTIONS OF THE
RECORD WHICH WERE NOT ADMISSIBLE AGAINST DEFENDANT.
The first issue on appeal is whether there is sufficient
evidence in the record to sustain conviction. Complicating the
issues which are before the court is the fact that defendant was
tried with a co-defendant who was convicted of homicide.
Although defendant was convicted of only one felony and two
misdemeanors, the trial lasted two and one half weeks, and the
record is substantial.

The size of the record, and the fact that

the bulk of the evidence was directed toward the co-defendant
complicates the chore of examining whether there was sufficient
evidence to convict the defendant.
The evidence is also difficult to examine because the trial
court instructed the jury not to consider the testimony of
several of the

witnesses against the defendant Travis Widdison.

(R.1628 p. 21 line 24 through page 22 line 7, R. 1631 p. 134 line
17 to p. 135 line 5 ) . Despite the trial court's instructions
preventing the jury from considering the testimony of certain
witnesses against Travis Widdison, the State has referenced the
proscribed testimony of Jamie Widdison as establishing some of
the facts in this matter. (Brief of Appellee, P.7, R. 1631:10002) .

Curiously, in its statement of facts (Which are supposed to

have been set forth in a light most favorable to the jury
verdict, Brief of appellee p. 5 footnote 2 ) , the State has also
1

made several references to R. 1618 which is part of the
preliminary hearing transcript, and which was not in evidence at
trial. (Brief of Appellee pp. 11, 12, 13). As they were not in
evidence at trial, defendant requests that the court not consider
these references in considering the facts.
II. THE RECORD LACKS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION.
In its brief the State admits that the evidence established
that Bobbie Dawn, and not the defendant actually inflicted the
injuries on the decedent. (Brief of Appellant P. 25). As
indicated in previous memoranda defendant's sufficiency challenge
is based on the fourth element of child abuse found in jury
instruction 13. (R. At 1612).

"4. Having the care or custody of

B.L., intentionally or knowingly permitted another to inflict a
serious injury upon B.L. a child under the age of 18." The
issues can be further focused to whether defendant had care or
custody of B.L., and whether he "knowingly or intentionally"
permitted Bobbie Dawn to inflict the injuries.
A. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE "CARE OR CUSTODY" OF B.L.
The first consideration on a sufficiency claim is statutory
interpretation. State v. Fisher, 972 P.2d 90, 97 (Utah App.
1998).

The statutory interpretation consideration includes

making a determination of the intent of the Legislature.
v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah App. 1987).

State

In the case at

bar, the terms requiring interpretation are "care or custody".
In his previous memorandum, appellant urged the court to apply
the definition of custody used in UCA 78-3a-103(1)(o)(Supp.
2

1998) .

The State has responded by claiming that the argument is

being raised for the first time on appeal. (Brief of Appellee at
P. 2 7 ) .

This argument was not made to raise a new issue on

appeal, but was intended to assist the court in giving effect to
the intent of the Legislature.

Section 78-3a-103(1)(o)(Supp.

1998) is the only place in the Utah Code where the Legislature
gives a definition of either of the terms in question.
Rather than use a reference to a statute of the State of
Utah to assist in defining "care or custody", the State urges
adoption of a definition used by the Arizona Supreme Court in
State v. Jones, 937 P.2d 310, 314 (Ariz. 1997).

Application of

the Arizona Statute would be sensible if the Arizona and Utah
statutes embodied the same prohibitions on conduct.
Unfortunately, the Arizona statute includes prohibition of
placing a child "in a situation where its person or health is
endangered." Id at 314.

That is very different from knowingly or

intentionally permitting another to inflict a serious injury on a
child.
Application of the Arizona and Webster's Dictionary
definition to the terms care or custody does not change the fact
that there is no evidence that Travis had "care or custody" at
the time the injuries were inflicted on B.L.

Many of the factors

used by the Arizona court to determine that Mr. Jones had care or
custody are not present in the case at bar.

Jones was a case

where a live-in boyfriend, who acted in every respect as a
stepfather, abused and murdered a young child.
3

The court in

Jones considered all of the factors in the relationship in
considering "care or custody."

Many of the factors considered in

Jones are not present in the case at bar.

There is no evidence

that Travis provided food or shelter for B.L.

There is no

evidence that Travis considered himself a stepfather to Bobbie
Dawn's children.

There is no evidence that Travis accepted

responsibility for B.L. by taking her out alone.

There is no

evidence that Travis dominated Bobbie Dawn, or controlled her
income.

There is no evidence that Travis assumed responsibility

for B.L. by providing for her, or by assuming the role as her
primary caretaker.

In Jones, the defendant was present when the

charged injuries were inflicted because the defendant inflicted
the injuries.

The above are all factors considered by the Jones

case which are not present in the case at bar.
The State argues that Defendant should be found to have care
or custody based on Leet v. State, 595 So. 2d 959 (Fla.App. 2
Dist. 1991).

While there are some similarities between the role

Mr. Leet assumed with his girlfriend's child, and the role Travis
assumed with B.L., the Leet decision has no application in the
case at bar.

Florida Code Section 827.04(1) provides for

conviction based on "culpable negligence."

(Leet at 962). Mr.

Leet's conviction was based on a "culpable negligence" standard,
and the definition of "care or custody" in Leet was broad so as
to include negligent conduct.

Where the standard is negligence,

a broad range of conduct can be considered by the jury.

In

footnote 3 of Leet, the court noted that the State did not prove
4

Mr. Leet had any legal malice or traditional criminal intent.

In

Leet it was not necessary to prove actual personal knowledge that
his omission would lead to death or great bodily harm, as the
statute as applied was based on criminal negligence. (Leet at 941
footnote 3)
Defendant has consistently admitted that at times he has had
care or custody of B.L.

(Brief of appellant at 15). Defendant's

objection is to the State's position that Travis was in a
permanent long term care or custody arrangement with B.L., and
that he had care or custody at the time the injuries were
inflicted.

There is nothing about the definition of care or

custody even using the definition proposed by the State that
would make it a permanent rather than shifting arrangement given
the facts present in the case at bar.

Travis admits, and the

record shows that there were times when he had care or custody of
B.L.

(R. 1600 at 216, Exhibit 3 9 at 19) The point that should be

noted is that Travis assumed care or custody only when B.L. was
not in Bobbie Dawn's custody, or when the child was not in her
care.
The State argues that the defendant has failed to marshal
the evidence regarding care or custody because the marshaling was
placed in an appendix, and was supposedly unfocused.

(Brief of

Appellant at 31). While marshaling evidence in an appendix may
not be the preferred method of placing the evidence before the
court, the evidence supporting the conviction has been made
available.

(The decisions criticizing this method of marshaling
5

are in civil rather than criminal cases.

A.K. & R. Whipple

Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Construction, 977 P.2d 518, 525
(Utah App. 1999)).

The State also argues that the marshaled

facts are unfocused and should not be considered.
is incorrect.
that

In his previous memoranda, defendant pointed out

the sufficiency claim applied only to a single element of

the crimes of which he was convicted.
ls) .

This argument

(Brief of Appellant at Il-

All of the marshaling is aimed toward a single element of

the crimes charged.

Further, every excerpt of the marshaled

testimony in the appendix contains a heading regarding what the
evidence demonstrates, and a statement regarding who is
testifying.

It is unfair to claim that the marshaling is

unfocused.
In reality, the marshaling which was done is unnecessary.
As previously set forth, Travis admits that at times he has had
care or custody of B.L.

(Brief of appellant at 15). The

evidence which is lacking is evidence that Travis had care or
custody at the time Bobbie Dawn inflicted the injuries.

There is

no need to marshal evidence which is not in the record.

Even if

the court were to ignore the facts marshaled by defendant, the
facts as set forth by the State on page 31 of the State's brief
do not demonstrate care or custody at the time the injuries were
inflicted.
B. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE KNOWING
CONDUCT.

6

Examination of the record demonstrates that there is no
evidence defendant was present when the injuries were inflicted
on B.L.

If the defendant was not present when the injuries were

inflicted, it requires speculation to infer that he knowingly and
intentionally permitted Bobbie Dawn to inflict the injuries.

The

State again argues that this evidence was not properly marshaled.
(Brief of appellee at 32) . What evidence exists on this point
was set forth in the marshaled facts in the appendix, and is
referred to and cited specifically in defendant's brief.
of Appellant at 15, 16).

(Brief

In reality, marshaling is not necessary

because there was no evidence Travis was present when the
injuries were inflicted.
The State marshaled evidence in its brief, and argues that
the evidence set forth supports the conviction.

Close

examination of the State's argument demonstrates that the
evidence set forth by the State in reality would support
conviction of crimes which were not charged.

The State prefaces

the evidence with the following statement: "The following
marshaled evidence supported a reasonable inference that
defendant knew thai: Bobbie Dawn was abusing Breanna and that he
did nothing to prevent the injuries he was charged with:".

The

problem with the State's position is that defendant was not
charged with failing to prevent injuries, or with knowing that
Bobbie Dawn had abused Breanna, and failing to report the abuse.
Had Travis been charged with failure to report abuse under UCA
62A-4a-411, the evidence would likely sustain conviction.
7

The

evidence might also have supported a conviction for obstructing
justice pursuant to 76-8-306

(1)(f).

The evidence does not demonstrate that on the specific
instances when the charged abuse was inflicted, Travis was
present, or knew Bobbie Dawn was inflicting the abuse.

U.C.A.

76-1-501 indicates in pertinent part as follows:
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be
innocent until each element of the offense charged against
him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such
proof, the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense"
mean:

(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the
definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
Despite the State's arguments to the contrary, being aware
of the abuse and failing report it, does not satisfy the elements
of UCA 76-5-109.

The elements of child abuse as set forth in the

jury instructions in this case the are as follows:
That the defendant, TRAVIS D. WIDDISON;
1. In Millard County, State of Utah;
2.

On or about February 10, 19 96;

3.
Intentionally or knowingly inflicted a serious physical
injury; that is a fracture of the right clavicle, upon B.L.,
a child under the age of 18, or,
4.
Having the care or custody of B.L., intentionally or
knowingly permitted another to inflict a serious injury upon
B.L., a child under the age of 18. (R. at 1612).

8

To satisfy the requirements of 76-1-501 set forth above, as
to the felony count, defendant would have to have known that
Bobbie Dawn was either inflicting, or about to inflict a serious
physical injury on B.L., and despite that knowledge, have
permitted the abuse to take place.

UCA 76-2-102 indicates that:

"every offense not involving strict liability shall require
a culpable mental state, and when the definition of the
offense does not specify a culpable mental state and the
offense does not involve strict liability, intent,
knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish
criminal responsibility."
UCA 76-6-109 requires that in the case at bar the State must have
demonstrated knowing or intentional conduct.

UCA 76-2-103 states

that:
A person engages in conduct:
(1)

Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or
cause the result.

(2)

Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his
conduct when he is aware of the nature of his
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person
acts knowingly,
or with knowledge, with respect
to a result of his conduct when he is aware that
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the
result.

There are no facts in evidence demonstrating that the
defendant acted either knowingly or intentionally with respect to
the counts with which he is specifically charged. It is difficult
to conclude that Travis acted knowingly or intentionally when it
is impossible not to conclude that Bobbie Dawn would have abused
her children regardless of whether Travis was residing in the

9

home.

Bobbie Dawn is alleged to have engaged in abuse long

before Travis was a resident of the home. (R.1601 at 66, R. 1631
at 102, R. 1631 at 68, 69) . Without demonstrating that Travis
was physically present when any of the charged acts of abuse
occurred, there is no union of act and intent, and defendant's
conviction cannot stand.
III. BAD ACTS EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AGAINST
TRAVIS WIDDISON.
The trial court in this matter made several rulings
regarding the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence pursuant
to Rules 401, 402, 403 and 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
The trial court held that acts allegedly committed by Travis
Widdison, which would usually be considered inadmissible
character evidence, should be admitted into evidence for other
purposes. (R. at 1383).

The core of the trial court's ruling is

Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b).

In its revised form Rule 404(b) is

as follows:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In
other words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible
if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the
requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
In the case at bar, the trial court admitted prior bad act
evidence based upon the following finding:
The Court finds that the proffered evidence is relevant and
admissible under Rule 402 and Rule 404(b), as it is material
to proof of issues such as identity, opportunity, knowledge,
10

and absence of accident. The proffered evidence is not
offered solely to establish the bad character of the
defendants. The Court finds that specific instances of
conduct toward B.L. by the defendants is relevant to show
not only a pattern of behavior, but absence of accident or
mistake, opportunity, knowledge, or identity. The State may
also offer evidence of abuse of J.W. and C.W., committed by
the defendants, subject to the court's balancing the
probative value of such evidence against its tendency to
unfairly prejudice the defendants during the trial. (R. At
1539, 1540).
Admission of prior bad acts evidence is admissible if it is
relevant for proper, non-character purposes.

State v. Decorso,

3 70 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 13 (Utah June 4, 1999) .
that all of the

The State argues

prior bad act evidence admitted was admitted for

the purposes set forth in the rule, and in the trial court's
ruling.(Brief of Appellee at 36, 37).
The difficulty with the States position is that the prior
bad act evidence which was offered might have been admissible had
the State attempted to prove that Defendant rather than Bobbie
Dawn inflicted the injuries on B.L.

The State admits on page 25

of its brief that Bobbie Dawn inflicted the abuse on B.L. (Brief
of Appellee at 25). This means that to be admissible, the
challenged evidence must have been offered to show that Travis
intentionally or knowingly permitted Bobbie Dawn to inflict
abuse.
The State argues that the bad acts evidence was necessary to
show absence of accident or mistake. (Brief of Appellee at 37) .
The basis of this argument is that it was necessary for the State
to demonstrate that B.L.'s injuries occurred intentionally rather
than as a result of an accident or mistake.
11

While this was

admittedly a proper use of prior bad act evidence against Bobbie
Dawn, the prior bad act evidence admitted against Travis did
little more than show bad character.
Examination of the specific bad acts admitted against
Travis Widdison demonstrates the difficulty with the State's
arguments for admission.

The evidence admitted against defendant

consists of testimony by C.W. that Travis hit her in the nose,
and struck her with a belt, (R. 1631 p. 47, 50, 62), and that he
spanked B.L. (R. 1631 at 40, 41, 4 4 ) .
The State's main argument is that the bad act evidence helps
eliminate arguments that B.L.'s injuries were the result of
accident or mistake.

The bad act evidence which was admitted

against Travis Widdison does not help the State in establishing
absence of accident or mistake.

Where what the State is

attempting to prove is that the defendant knowing or
intentionally permitted Bobbie Dawn to inflict abuse on B.L., the
fact that Travis may have injured C.W. or spanked B.L. does not
help in proving that fact.

Those facts merely inflame the jury

against the defendant, and should not have been admitted.
The challenged evidence is also inadmissible under Rules 401
and 403 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 401 of the

Utah Rules of Evidence describes relevant evidence as:
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence
fact that is of consequence to the determination of
action more probable or less probable than it would
without the evidence." (Utah Rules of Evidence Rule

of any
the
be
401) .

The bad act evidence which was admitted against Travis
Widdison does not make it more or less probable that Travis
12

permitted Bobbie Dawn to injure B.L.

The evidence is therefore

inadmissible.
The prior bad act evidence should also have been excluded
under Rule 403, which states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
The challenged evidence was extremely prejudicial against
Travis Widdison.

It: cast him in a role before the jury as a

violent abusive person.

This evidence was admitted despite the

fact that the State's evidence showed that all of the physical
acts of abuse were performed by the co-defendant.

It is

reasonable to infer chat the challenged evidence prejudiced
defendant by leading the jury to convict based on the perception
that he is a bad person, rather than based on the facts in
evidence.

The danger of the improperly admitted evidence is

extreme because defendant's conviction is at best based on
inferences.
IV.

THE STATE'S PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE VIOLATED PRINCIPLES OF
ORDER OF PROOF.
In response to the issues raised by defendant regarding

order of proof, the State argues that the bad act evidence was
necessarily offered in the case in chief for purposes of proving
B.L. was not injured accidently. (Brief of Appellee at 25
footnote 15) . The State argues that by pleading not guilty,
defendants placed all of the elements of the crime at issue.

13

The State's position is difficult for two reasons.

First,

admission of bad act evidence violated the requirements of State
v. Holder. 694 P. 2d 583 (Utah 1984) .

Admission of the prior bad

act evidence in the State's case in chief in effect forced
defendant to take the witness stand, something he cannot be
required to do.
The second difficulty with the State's position is that the
prior bad act evidence admitted against Travis did not
demonstrate that B.L. was not injured accidently.

There was no

evidence that Travis inflicted the injuries on B.L.

While

evidence of Bobbie Dawn's prior bad acts helped the State
establish that she injured B.L., none of the evidence went to
whether Travis knowingly or intentionally permitted her to do so.
V.

C.W. SHOULD HAVE TESTIFIED IN OPEN COURT.
J.W. and C.W., testified by closed circuit television.

at

1612).

(R.

It is defendant's position that the trial court's

finding that C.W. should testify by closed circuit was not
supported by the evidence.

The State argues that the trial

court's finding that C.W. would "suffer serious emotional
strain," or that her testimony would be "inherently unreliable,"
are supported by the record.

The court's findings where based on

the report of Dr. Kevin Gulley. (R. At 1532-31).

Defendant's

challenge to the trial court's findings is based on statements in
Dr. Gully's report. (R. at 1366-67).
The State argues that the statements made by Dr. Gully in
his report, and during his testimony in court support the
14

findings of the trial court. (Brief of Appellee at 43-44).

The

testimony the State relies on are statements that "there may be
some degradation in [C.W.'s] capacity to recall information if
the presence of [the defendants] means that she will be exposed
to the more complex environment of the general courtroom, because
they may distract her and create more anxiety." (R. At 1367) .
Dr. Gully indicated C.W. would answer questions in defendant's
presence, but that she might not respond fully if she believes it
will stop her from seeing her mother, or if she feels
embarrassed. (R. At 1367) .

C.W. told the Doctor she would not be

able to testify if her mother or defendant were present. (R.
13 61).

Dr. Gully indicated C.W. would be more responsive if she

testified outside defendant's presence. (R. at 1612).
Contrasting Dr. Gully's testimony and report with the
requirements of Rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
demonstrates that the trial court's findings are not adequately
supported and that therefore, the requirements of Maryland v.
Craig

497 U.S. 837, 840, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 3160 (1990) have not

been satisfied.

There is not sufficient evidence in the report

or the testimony to support the trial court's findings.

Dr.

Gully describes the any emotional distress which C.W. would
experience as something that would be very short term.
at 87).

(R. 1612

Dr. Gully also failed to indicate that C.W.'s testimony

would be "inherently unreliable."

As to C.W., Dr. Gully's report

does not support a finding of "serious emotional or mental
strain."

Dr. Gully testified that C.W. could testify without
15

"serious emotional trauma." (R. at 1368-67).
seems to be advocating is

What the State

that any anxiety, or any degradation

in testimony is sufficient to justify eliminating defendant's
confrontation rights.
Allowing C.W. to testify by closed circuit was
prejudicial to defendant's case because she was the only witness
who testified that he had acted physically toward any of Bobbie
Dawn's children.
VI.

DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR CHANGE OF VENUE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
GRANTED.
In his previous memorandum, defendant argued that the trial

court abused its discretion by not granting one of several
motions to change venue. (Brief of appellant at 31-35).

The

basis for the motions was extensive pretrial publicity, and the
fact that physicians who were to be witnesses in the trial had
treated B.L. and were likely to have treated several of the
jurors.
The State argues that defendant conceded the impartiality of
the jury by passing the jury for cause.
46).

(Brief of appellee at

The State's argument is apparently based on State v.

Pearson 943 P.2d 1347 (Utah 1997) .

In Pearson, the defendant

passed the jury panel for cause, and the motion for change of
venue was never renewed based on excessive publicity.

(Pearson

at 1350) .
The facts

in the case at bar are significantly different.

The motion to change venue was made and denied prior to trial,
16

but the trial court offered to reconsider its decision if an
impartial jury could not be impaneled. (R. 1604 at 16-17, R. 497,
R. 1608 at 67-69, R. 1607 at 6-8).

The defense renewed the

motion after the first 15 jurors had been questioned on voir
dire.

The basis of the motion was that 12 of the 15 had read or

heard about the case, and 11 of the 15 had been treated by
doctors who would be witnesses. (R. 1605 at 38-39).

Defendant

Bobbie Widdison made the motion two more times during voir dire.
(R. 1605 at 157-158, R. 1604 at 16-17).
the motions. (R. 1604 at 17) .

The court again denied

In Pearson the motion to change

venue was made prior to trial, was denied and never renewed after
or during voir dire.

(Pearson at 1349).

In the case at bar, the motion to change venue was made
prior to trial, and was renewed continually during jury selection
as set forth above.

There was no reason to challenge the panel

for cause, because the previous motions had been made and denied.
(R.1604, 16-17, R. 497, R.1608 at 67-69, 1607 at 6-8, R. 1605 at
157-158) .

Further objections would not have made it any more

clear to the trial court that defendants believed the jury panel
was not impartial because of the extensive pretrial publicity,
and the personal relationships between potential jurors and
witnesses.
The exposure of jurors to media and other pretrial reports
of facts of the case can be demonstrated by examining the record.
(R. at 1604, page and line: 13-14, 15-15, 21-23, 36-24, 37-2, 4524, 46-12, 48-23, 85-17, 104-5, 104-7, 105-18, 105-20, 110-7,
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139-25, 140-20, 158-3, 163-15, 171-24, 178-8, 85-17, 88-21, 14024, 20-6, 20-9, 21-17, 42-3, 42-4, 48-18, 171-21, 178-8, 205-8,
20-7, 66-23, 88-22, 149-24, 171-25, 13-22, 16-19, 77-6).
R. 1605 page and line:

44-5, 44-22, 45-24, 45-25, 46-3, 48-20,

65-6, 65-14, 65-15, 66-12, 67-20, 67-23, 88-24, 91-8, 115-17,
117-16, 128-3, 177-17, 123-3, 128-6, 139-14, 139-17, 193-20, 1112, 111-6, 116-1, 116-2, 149-6, 199-9, 199-10, 74-17, 160-5, 16013, 164-25, 170-20, 205-1, 217-5, 217-6, 217-7, 218-8, 160-14,
215-1, 157-7, 157-8, 157-15, 157-20, 160-21, 163-2, 163-11, 16313, 163-16, 164-6, 164-7, 164-11, 165-3, 167-22, 206-18, 206-21,
206-23, 213-4, 213-9.)
Where nearly every potential juror had prior knowledge of
facts of the case, and many of the potential jurors had personal
Dr. patient relationships with witnesses in the case, it was
clearly an abuse of discretion not to grant the motions for
change of venue.
VII. THE PRIOR TAPED INTERVIEWS OF J.W. AND C.W. SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ADMITTED.
Exhibit 87 is a transcript of a taped interview with J.W.
and C.W. which took place at a foster home shortly after B.L.'s
death.

(R. 1600 at 143).

It was the intention of the defense to

allow the jury to listen to the tape of the interview.

The

transcript was made part of the record for review purposes.
1600 at 152).

(R.

After objection and proffer, the trial court held

the evidence inadmissible.

(R. 1600 at 144-151).
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The State argues that the evidence should be excluded based
on the ruling by the trial court. (Brief of Appellee at 50) .

It

is defendant's position that the jury should have been allowed to
listen to the tape, or read the transcript, and that failure to
admit the evidence was prejudicial to defendant.
The statements should have been admitted based on
inconsistency with J.W. and C.W.'s testimony, on the basis that
improper techniques were used in interviewing the children, and
that the statements were necessary to impeach the children's
testimony. (R. 1600 at 148-149) .
The trial court excluded the evidence on the basis that it
was hearsay and inadmissible under Rule of Evidence 802.

A prior

statement of a witness is not hearsay where the statement is
"inconsistent with the declarant's testimony. . ."
Utah Rules of Evidence).

(Rule 801

At trial, C.W. testified that Travis

hit her in the nose, and struck her with a belt, (R. 1631 p. 47,
50, 62), and that he and the co-defendant spanked B.L. (R. 1631
at 40, 41, 44). This testimony is inconsistent with C.W.'s
statements in exhibit 87 that Travis did not spank B.L.

(R. 1600

at 146), that he didn't do anything to B.L., (R. 1600 at 146),
and that Travis is nice to C.W. (R. 1600 at 146). These are
inconsistent statements which should have been admitted.
VIII. DEFENDANT'S REMAINING ARGUMENTS ARE ADEQUATELY SET FORTH IN
THE PREVIOUS BRIEF.
In his previous brief defendant discussed issues regarding
the admissibility of statements to his ex-wife, (brief of
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Appellant at 39) , denial of defendants motion to dismiss or for a
directed verdict, (brief of appellant at 41), refusal of the
trial judge to give a particular jury instruction, (brief of
appellant at 44) denial of motions for mistrial, (brief of
appellant at 46) , and the effect of cumulative error (brief of
appellant at 48). Upon review of defendant's previous brief, and
the brief filed by the State in this matter, it appears that
additional briefing by appellant would not be helpful to the
court in reviewing this matter.

Defendant will therefore submit

the matter based on the previous brief.
IX. CONCLUSION
Based on the preceding argument, and on the argument set for
in appellant's brief, if the court finds that the evidence was
insufficient to convict defendant, or that the State failed offer
sufficient evidence to survive defendant's motion to dismiss or
for a directed verdict, defendant respectfully requests that his
conviction be reversed.

If the court finds harmful error

pursuant to any of the other arguments set forth in defendant' s
briefs, defendant requests a new trial.
DATED this P/^

day of December, 1999.

SCRIBNER, STIRLAND, & MCCANDLESS, P.C.

BY:
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APPENDIX I
Rules

Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or
by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
the same:
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of
character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by
the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character
trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in
a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first
aggressor:
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a
witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In other words,
evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant
for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of
Rules 402 and 403.

Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement*" is d) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by
the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A ^declarant" is a person who makes a
statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay"* is a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not
hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by icitness. The declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning
the statement and the statement is t A> inconsistent with the
declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the
statement or has forgotten, or < B» consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive, or -O one of identification of a person
made after perceiving the person: or
(2) Admission by parzy-opponent. The statement is offered
against a party and is < A- the party's own statement, in either
an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement
of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party
to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or sen-ant concerning a matter
within the scope of the agency or employment, made during
the existence of the relationship, or (E» a statement by a
coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance
of the conspiracy.
Rule 802. Hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by
these rules.

APPENDIX II
Statutes

62A-4a-411. Failure to report — Criminal penalty.
Any person, official, or institution required to report a case
of suspected child abuse, child sexual abuse, neglect, fetal
alcohol syndrome, or fetal drug dependency, who willfully fails
to do so is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Action for failure to
report must be commenced within four years from the date of
knowledge of the offense and the willful failure to report.
1994

76-1-501. Presumption of innocence —- -'Element of the
offense" defined.
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof,
the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words ""element of the offense"
mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circums:ances, or results of
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense:
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements
of the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of
the evidence.
1973

76-5-109. Child abuse.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Child"' means a human being who is 17 years of age
or less.
(b) "Child abuse"" means any offense described in Subsection (2) or (3), or in Section 76-5-109.1.
(c) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of
a child which impairs the physical condition of the child,
including:
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin;
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion:
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition: or
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's
health or welfare and which is not a serious physical
injury as defined in Subsection < l)(d>.
(d) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury
or set of injuries which seriously impairs the child's
health, or which involves physical torture or causes serious emotional harm to the child, or which involves a
substantial risk of death to the child, including:
(i) fracture of any bone or bones;
(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of
the brain, whether caused by blows, shaking, or
causing the child's head to impact with an object or
surface;
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot
water, or those caused by placing a hot object upon
the skin or body of the child;
(iv) any injur/ caused by use of a dangerous
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601:
(v) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted by the same person, either at the same
time or on different occasions:
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body;
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in
severe emotional harm, severe developmental delay
or retardation, or severe impairment of the child's
abilitv to function;
(viii) any injur/ which creates a permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of a bodily member, limb, or organ;
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease
breathing, even if resuscitation is successful following the conduct: or

(x) any conduct which results in starvation or
failure to thrive or malnutrition that jeopardizes the
child's life.
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical
injury or, having the care or custody of such child, causes or
permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a child
is guilty of an offense as follows:
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a
felony of the second degree:
(b) if done recklessly the offense is a felony of the third
degree; or
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a
class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or,
having the care or custody of such child, causes or permits
another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of an
offense as follows:
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a
class A misdemeanor
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor: or
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a
class C misdemeanor.
(4) A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with
t r e a t m e n t by spiritual means alone through prayer, in lieu of
medical treatment, in accordance with the tenets and practices of an established church or religious denomination of
which the parent or legal guardian is a member or adherent
shall not, for that reason alone, be deemed to have committed
an offense under this section.
1999

76-8-306. Obstructing justice.
(1) A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent to hinder,
prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension, prosecution,
conviction, or punishment of another for the commission of a
crime, he:
(aj knowing an offense has been committed, conceals it
from a magistrate;
(b) harbors or conceals the offender,
(c) provides the offender a weapon, transportation,
disguise, or other means for avoiding discovery or apprehension;
(d) warns the offender of impending discovery or apprehension;
(e) conceals, destroys, or alters any physical evidence
that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, or conviction of the person;
(f) obstructs by force, intimidation, or deception anyone from performing an act that might aid in the discovery apprehension, prosecution, or conviction of the person; or
(g) having knowledge that a law enforcement oScer
has beeA authorized or has applied for authorization
under either Section 77-23a-10 or 77-23a-15 to intercept a
wire, electronic, or oral communication, gives notice or
attempts to give notice of the possible interception tc any
person.
(2)~ An offense under Subsections (U(a) through (f) is a class
B misdemeanor, unless the actor knows that the offender
committed a capital offense or a felony of the first degree, in
\yhich case the offense is a ^second degree felony(3) An offense under Subsection (l)<g) is a third degree
felony.
(4)' Subsection (l)(f) does not apply to an act against a juror.
Obstructing the function of a juror is addressed in Section
76-8-508.57
(5) The provisions of Section 76-8-316 shall govern an act or
threat against a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons
and Parole or the judge's or member's immediate family. 1995

76-2-102. Culpable mental state required — Strict liability.
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a
culpable mental state, and when the definition of the offense
does not specify a culpable mental state and the offense does
not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness
shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense
shall involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal
responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited by the
statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental state.
1983

76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent
or willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge";
"recklessly, or maliciously'; and "criminal
negligence or criminally negligent."
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his
conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he
is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause
the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or "the result of his
conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise under all the circumstances as
viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent
with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or
the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances
as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
1974

78-3a-103. DefinitionsCD As used in this chapter:
(a) "Abused child" includes a minor less than 18 years
of age who:
(i) has suffered or been threatened with
nonaccidental physical or mental harm, negligent
treatment, or sexual exploitation; or
(ii) has been the victim of any sexual abuse.
(b) "Adjudication" means a finding by the court, incorporated in a decree, that the facts alleged in the petition
have been proved.
(c) "Adult" means a person 18 years of age or over,
except that persons 18 years or over under the continuing
jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to Section
78-3a-121 shall be referred to as minors.
(d) "Board" means the Board of Juvenile Court Judges.
(e) "Child placement agency" means:
(i) a private agency licensed to receive minors for
placement or adoption under this code; or
(ii) a private agency receiving minors for placement or adoption in another state, which agency is
licensed or approved where such license or approval
is required by law.
(f) "Commit" means to transfer legal custody.
(g) "Court" means the juvenile court.
(h) "Dependent child" includes a minor who is homeless
or without proper care through no fault of his parent,
guardian, or custodian.
(i) "Deprivation of custody" means transfer of legal
custody by the court from a parent or the parents or a
previous legal custodian to another person, agency, or
institution.
(j) "Detention" means home detention and secure detention as defined in Section 62A-7-101 for the temporary
care of minors who require secure custody in physically
restricting facilities:
(i) pending court disposition or transfer to another
jurisdiction; or
(ii) while under the continuing jurisdiction of the
court.
(k) "Formal referral" means a written report from a
peace officer or other person informing the court that a
minor is or appears to be within the court's jurisdiction
and that a petition may be filed.

(1) "Group rehabilitation therapy" means psychological
and social counseling of one or more persons in the group,
depending upon the recommendation of the therapist.
(m) "Guardianship of the person" includes the authority to consent to marriage, to enlistment in the armed
forces, to major medical, surgical, or psychiatric treatment, and to legal custody, if legal custody is not vested in
another person, agency, or institution.
(n) "Habitual truant" is a school-age minor who has
received more than two truancy citations within one
school year from the school in which the minor is or
should be enrolled and eight absences without a legitimate or valid excuse or who, in defiance of efforts on the
part of school authorities as required under Section 53A11-103, refuses to regularly attend school or any scheduled period of the school day.
(o) "Legal custody" means a relationship embodying
the following rights and duties:
(i) the right to physical custody of the minor;
(ii) the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline the minor;
(iii) the duty to provide the minor with food, clothing, shelter, education, and ordinary medical care;
(iv) the right to determine where and with whom
the minor shall live; and
(v) the right, in an emergency, to authorize surgery
or other extraordinary care,
(p) "Minor" means a person under the age of 18 years.
It includes the term "child" as used in other parts of this
chapter.
(q) "Natural parent" means a minors biological or
adoptive parent, and includes the minor's noncustodial
parent.
(r) (i) "Neglected child" means a minor:
(A) whose parent, guardian, or custodian has
abandoned or subjected the minor to mistreatment or abuse;
(B) who lacks proper parental care by reason
of the fault or habits of the parent, guardian, or
custodian;
(C) whose parent, guardian, or custodian fails
or refuses to provide proper or necessary subsistence, education, or medical care, including surgery or psychiatric services when required, or
any other care necessary for health, safety, morals, or well-being; or

(D) who is at risk of being a neglected or
abused child as defined in this chapter because
another minor in the same home is a neglected or
abused child as defined in this chapter,
(ii) The aspect of neglect related to education,
described in Subsection (l)(r)(i)(C), means that, after
receiving notice that a minor has been frequentlyabsent from school without good cause, or that the
minor has failed to cooperate with school authorities
in a reasonable manner, a parent or guardian fails to
make a good faith effort to ensure that the minor
receives an appropriate education.
(iii) A parent or guardian legitimately practicing
religious beliefs and who, for that reason, does not
provide specified medical treatment for a minor, is
not guilty of neglect,
(s) "Nonjudicial adjustment" means closure of the case
by the assigned probation officer without judicial determination upon the consent in writing of the minor, the
parent, legal guardian or custodian, and the assigned
probation officer.
(t) "Probation" means a legal status created by court
order following an adjudication on the ground of a violation of law or under Section 78-3a-104, whereby the minor
is permitted to remain in his home under prescribed
conditions and under supervision by the probation department or other agency designated by the court, subject to
return to the court for violation of any of the conditions
prescribed.
(u) "Protective supervision" means a legal status created by court order following an adjudication on the
ground of abuse, neglect, or dependency, whereby the
minor is permitted to remain in his home, and supervision
and assistance to correct the abuse, neglect, or dependency is provided by the probation department or other
agency designated by the court.
(v) "Residual parental rights and duties" means those
rights and duties remaining with the parent after legal
custody or guardianship, or both, have been vested in
another person or agency, including the responsibility for
support, the right to consent to adoption, the right to
determine the child's religious affiliation, and the right to
reasonable visitation unless restricted by the court. If no
guardian has been appointed, "residual parental rights

and duties" also include the right to consent to marriage,
to enlistment, and to major medical, surgical, or psychiatric treatment.
(w) "Secure facility" means any facility operated by or
under contract with the Division of Youth Corrections,
that provides 24-hour supervision and confinement for
youth offenders committed to the division for custody and
rehabilitation.
(x) "Shelter" means the temporary care of minors in
physically unrestricted facilities pending court disposition or transfer to another jurisdiction.
(y) "State supervision" means a disposition which provides a more intensive level of intervention than standard
probation but is less intensive or restrictive than a community placement with the Division of Youth Corrections.
(z) "Termination of parental rights" means the permanent elimination of all parental rights and duties, including residual parental rights and duties, by court order.
(aa) "Therapist" means a person employed by a state
division or agency for the purpose of conducting psychological treatment and counseling of a minor in its custody,
or any other person licensed or approved by the state for
the purpose of conducting psychological treatment and
counseling.
(2) As used in Part 3, Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency
Proceedings, with regard to the Division of Child and Family
Services:
(a) "Custody" means the custody of a minor in the
Division of Child and Family Services as of the date of
disposition.
(b) "Protective custody" means the shelter of a minor by
the Division of Child and Family Services from the time
the minor is removed from home until the shelter hearing,
or the minor's return home, whichever occurs earlier.
(c) "Temporary custody" means the custody of a minor
in the Division of Child and Family Services from the date
of the shelter hearing until disposition.
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